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  4 ABSTRACT 
 
This paper aims at analyzing regional development in Brazil regarding its financial conditions. 
It departs from the features of the federalism and decentralization in Brazil, as well as the state and 
local expenditures. We intends to investigate the role of the federalism and decentralization after the 
recentralization of taxes and budget in Brazilian economy. Conclusions highlight the importance of 
financial sector as one of the influential aspects of regional imbalances in Brazil. 
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  5 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between regional imbalances and strengthening of the financial system is not 
simple. In a nationwide based financial system as in Brazil this aspect deserves a special treatment, 
particularly if we recognize that regional development policy cannot be analyzed without a connection 
to macroeconomic policy, to fiscal mechanisms of public financing, to the nature of the fiscal 
federalism and to the Fiscal Responsibility Law.
1 
In this sense, the decentralization, the fiscal federalism as well as the autonomy of sub-
national governments are crucial for articulating regional development policy in Brazil. In fact, tax 
revenues share and the autonomy of federative units are critical success factors for financing regional 
development.  Therefore, the Constitutional Funds for regional development, created through the 
Constitution of 1988 in Brazil, as well as others regional development funds have an important role. 
The Constitutional Funds – FNO (Constitutional Fund for the North), FNE (Constitutional 
Fund for the Northeast) and the FCO (Constitutional Fund for the Center-West) – perform the function 
of financing economic and social development of least developed regions. They are composed of 3% 
of two taxes, the Income Tax and the Tax on Industrialized Products (IPI). Of the total collected, 60% 
goes to the FNE and the remaining 40% to others funds. In order to evaluate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of these funds in reducing regional imbalances in Brazil its important to analyze the 
evolution of their transfers and their financing sources. 
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the conditions within which regional policies are 
financed in Brazil as well as the inequalities in Brazilian financial system. The starting points are the 
financing sources in a context of tax resources sharing and expending autonomy of the federative 
states. We intend to investigate particularly the role of federalism in regional financing in Brazil. We 
shall denote federalism a system that favors, not only the financing autonomy of the subunits, but also 
the reduction of regional inequalities through an efficient program of tax transfers. The analysis of 
credit concentration and its role in the deepness of regional imbalances uses information at municipal 
level on credit supply and others variables obtained from the SISBACEN
2 database. 
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 contain an appraisal of the federalism in 
Brazil and the Fiscal Responsibility Law. These aspects provide some empirical background for a 
discussion on Financing Funds and the role of credit at regional level focused on sections 4 and 5. We 
close with some concluding notes and proposals for financing regional development. 
 
                                                       
1 The Fiscal Responsibility Law, from 05.04.2000, establish the relationship among federal government, municipalities, and 
states in Brazil. It will be discussed more detailed ahead. 
2 Database from the Brazilian Central Bank. 
  6 2. FEDERALISM, FINANCING AND THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL 
 
  The Constitution of 1988 increased tax revenue of states and municipalities in Brazil, 
concluding a process of decentralization started in the middle of the 1970’s. The new Constitution 
tried to correct the distortions of the previous one and to rescue the principles of the fiscal federalism, 
lost with the tax reform on the first military government in the middle of the 1960’s. With the merger 
of some taxes and modernization of others, the intention was to build a modern structure, progressive 
and less unfair than the previous one. More than this, the chapter on taxes of the 1988’s Constitution 
allowed both more autonomy and an increase in the municipalities tax revenue. It aimed also to reduce 
regional inequalities through the creation of special Funds for financing least developed regions (FNO, 
FCO and FNE). These funds would have guaranteed sources since they represented the quota-part of 
two important taxes, the IPI and IR. 
From the viewpoint of taxes, tributes and improvements of the system, the new constitution 
presented few differences regarding the previous structure. There were no significant differences in 
terms of simplification and volume of tributes, but a reduction from an amount of 17 taxes to 15. 
However, the merger of six indirect taxes in one tax of enlarged base, corrected some distortions and 
simplified the collecting. An important aspect concerning taxes on property (IPTU and ITR) was the 
possibility of the introduction of a progressive tax. Undoubtedly, this could have meant a great 
improvement comparing to the previous structure, as it could have increased the fairness in the 
distribution of the tax onus on urban property.  
    As for the distribution of tax competences, the new Constitution represented an 
improvement in the tax revenue for States and municipalities. According to SERRA AND AFONSO 
(1992), the municipalities were those who have owned the benefits of the tax decentralization. 
    Regarding the States, the volume of taxes remained unchanged, except for the base of tax 
revenue which was enlarged, mostly owing to the change of the ICM in ICMS (VAT). An important 
element in this enlargement was the possibility to include an addition over the income tax due to the 
Federal Government for individual or firms. This additional amounted up to 5% of the paid tax on 
profits and capital profits. Finally, the new Constitution enlarged the States Fund of Participation in 
the income tax and in the tax on industrialized products.  
    The municipalities, on the other side, were the main beneficiaries in the share of the tax 
system, through the amplification of tax competences and transfers from the Federal government and 
States. SERRA AND AFONSO (1992) notice that, even before the promulgation of the new 
constitution, there was already a process of increasing in the transfers from Federal Government to 
municipalities, besides the possibility of growing expenses through credit operations. 
Regarding the transfers, the most important modification was the amplification of the quota 
part of the ICMS (VAT) from 20% to 25%. It’s also important to notice that this change not only in 
the increase of the percentage of transfers, but also in the enlargement of the base of tax revenue. 
Besides, the proportion of transfers to municipalities Fund of Participation (IR and IPI) raised from 
17% to 22,5%, and the IOF on the gold started to be shared in 70% on the municipalities. Finally, 
according to the Constitution of 1988 it is prohibited to the Federal Government the exemption of 
municipal taxes, altering a common practice used during the military period that hurts severely the 
fiscal federalism. 
  7 As for the structure of expenses, the changes represented a better society control on public 
budget. There were also restrictions to public debt and to credit operations exceeding capital expenses. 
This process culminated in the promulgation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) in 2000, which 
limits the augmentation of expenditures via indebting. 
The period following the promulgation of the Constitution, particularly after the Real Plan, 
represented a decreasing capacity to the financing of States and municipalities. The reasons were 
twofold: the rise in social demands resulting from the increase in the unemployment and under-
employment in metropolitan zones, and the centralizing policy implemented by federal government. 
Besides, the tax competition between states and the municipalities in metropolitan regions, by 
increasing the unemployment, produced an elevation in demand for social expenditures, which were 
difficult to afford by municipalities, unable to increase their debt due to the constraints imposed by the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law. 
  Despite last years economic stagnation, the Tax Burden in Brazil is persistently growing since 
1994. However, it is not equally distributed between states. In fact, the federal government was the 
main beneficiary through taxes and federal contributions. From 1993 up to 2002, there was an 
elevation of almost 39%, which does not find equivalent at international level. The main reasons for 
this behavior are the policies of increasing social contributions and the positive effects of the 
stabilization on the amount of tax revenue. Besides, this outstanding growth is also a consequence of 
improvements in federal tax revenue and inspection strategies.  
  Regardless the difficulties of international comparison due to methodological differences in 
the measure of the tax burden, we may say that Brazil’s levels of tax revenue are similar to developed 
countries. The largest tax burdens are those from European countries, exceeding, in some cases, 50 % 
of the GNP while USA’s GTB is about 35 % of the GNP. In 2002, the GTB was 18,3 % in Mexico 
and 19,9 % in Chile. 
The Tax Burden in Brazil can also be analyzed from the point of view of distribution of tax 
resources and of taxes by incidence. The first case is important since despite the increase in 
municipalities participation in the tax share following the 1988 Constitution, after the Real Plan the 
federal government has been trying to re-centralize the distribution of tax resources and at the same 
time is relocating many federal expenses to municipalities. 
Concerning the sharing of tributes by base of incidence, there was an outstanding increase in 
the share of indirect and cumulative tributes. The literature on equity of tax base demonstrates clearly 
that indirect taxes are easier to collect. However, it is important to notice that this kind of tribute has a 
strong concentrating characteristic in economies with higher levels of income concentration, mainly 
because they disregard the consumer’s distributive profile. This is precisely the Brazilian case. The tax 
incidence (direct and indirect) on income of individuals earning up to three minimum wages is higher 
if compared to individuals whose income is larger than ten minimum wages. This fact demonstrates 
the income concentrating characteristic of the tax structure in Brazil. 
The tax incidence on Goods and Services represents almost half of the total amount collected. 
It’s worthy to note that the Cofins - Contribution for the Financing of Social Security – (ex Finsocial) 
rose from 5,4%, in the beginning of 1990’s to around 11% of the total tax revenue in 2002, more than 
duplicating its participation in the GNP in this period. The predominance of indirect taxes on goods 
and services is a typical example of the federal government strategy to speed up the tax collection. 
  8 Indirect taxes are politically more viable of approval and have a quite high productivity. This explains 
the increase in the participation of these taxes in the total tax revenue. Furthermore, this strategy, when 
based on cumulative taxes (like Cofins and CPMF), acts as a good mechanism to increase total tax 
revenue. However, this not only undermine equity principles, but also causes vertical conflicts, 
particularly when we observe that the cumulative taxes, mostly created in the last decade, are federal 
taxes. This is an important point, since the increase in Gross Tax Burden in Brazil, in the last ten 
years, came together with a tax re-centralization. It is also worthy to note that the tax incidence on 
Property and Income in Brazil, though it has increased in the last five years (particularly the Income 
tax), still very low, corresponding to around 8,5 % of the GNP and 24 % of the total tax revenue in 
2002. 
As already pointed out, the strategy of tax burden augmentation in Brazil in the last ten years 
decreased the share of States and municipalities over the tax allotment, resulting not only in a 
exasperation of the vertical and horizontal conflicts, but also in a negative impact on the opportunity 
of using tax transfers as a mechanism to reduce regional imbalances. 
The share of the federal government grew from 61,7% of the total in 1995 to 64,1% in 2003. 
Nevertheless, after the voluntary transfers and other types of transfers, the municipalities share 
increased to the detriment of States and Federal government. Actually, an increase in the 
municipalities share would not be a concern per se. The central question in this point is that a great 
volume of voluntary transfers imposes to these sub-unities an unhealthy position of dependence on 
federal resources. Its important to note that the share of the municipalities in their own income revenue 
and in the available revenue rose after 1988, validating the argument that the Constitution of 1988 
represented, particularly for municipalities, a better availability of tax resources.  
For the States, however, the situation became worse, since the Available Revenues (in the 
enlarged concept) dropped from 27% in 1997 to 24,6% in 2003, accentuating the slow, although 
systematic, re-centralization process. The increase on GTB in this period obviously also represented 
an increase in the participation of the States in the ratio tax revenue/GDP. However, as already 
exhaustively observed, an increase in public expenditure, as a result of higher social demands and 
relocation of more attributions to these sub-unities, acted as a counterbalance to the process of 
augmentation of the tax revenue. Not forgetting that we also must include the financial costs of State 
debts re-negotiated in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) government as well as the 
limitations imposed by the FRL
3 on the increase of expenses. 
Since the Constitution of 1988, particularly from FHC years on, several tributes of strictly 
federal competence were created and re-articulated without distribution sharing with the federative 
sub-unities. More than this, the transfers of federal attributions represented additional responsibilities 
of great proportions for these sub-unities, particularly the municipalities. 
As a result of the policies implemented by federal government in the last years, the 
decomposition of the Sales Tax Burden on value added tributes – ICMS and IPI – and cumulative - 
Cofins, Pis/Pasep, CPMF, IOF and ISS – points out to the decreasing tendency of the ICMS and IPI 
taxes, and to the augmentation of cumulative taxes, mainly the general sales taxes – Cofins, Pis/Pasep 
and CPMF. 
                                                       
3 These data can be obtained in Jayme Jr  &  Santos (2004). 
  9 There has been an excessive creation of cumulative social contributions, as they allow a rapid 
increase in the amount of both the tax revenue assembled and the availability of resources. The clear 
re-centralization of tax resources and the increase in States and municipalities expenses, particularly 
after 1995 and worsened since 1999 has increased the financial troubles. The result is a perverse 
combination: elevation of the Gross Tax Burden simultaneously to the collapse in the participation of 
the sub-spheres in resource distribution. We can add to the already tricky situation in terms of 




3. THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON REGINAL FINANCING 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), from 04.05.2000, aims at a more balanced and 
transparent administration of public resources. The rulers of Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
Powers, as well as the Federal Attorney and the three spheres of government (federal, state and 
municipal), are now responsible for their budgets and targets, in a way to avoid unmanageable 
expenses without the endorsement of the Federal Government. As regards control and accountability 
of public expenses to society, the FRL is an indisputable advancement. However, as an instrument of 
demand encouragement it has clear limitations. In this sense, allocation of public expenses as an 
instrument of development and mitigation of regional disparities challenges the law’s major 
objectives. Actually, the theoretical approach behind the FRL, although not explicitly, restrains the 
fiscal instruments needed to economic cycle stabilization in a Keynesian way. 
The FRL as originally conceived (what does not mean that it could be modified), depends on 
several items: a government that guarantees fiscal balance for its full efficiency, a Debt/GDB rapport 
that is compatible with inter-temporal solvency, institutional reforms that should ensure property 
rights and legal institutional conditions to assure private investments. A detailed analysis of its costs 
and benefits to fiscal policies is a subject of this topic. 
Undoubtedly, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) constitutes a dividing wall in Brazilian 
public administration It introduces new management practices of public finances as it establishes 
clear and precise rules for the control of expenses and public debt. It compels rulers to account for 
their acts or omissions in a regular basis and values the planning as a routine in fiscal 
administration. In addition, the FRL normalizes and modernizes the federative vertical relations. 
In fact, despite the efforts of democratization behind the reforms in the 1988’s Constitution which 
provide more autonomy and a better financial structure for States and municipalities, the 
horizontal and vertical federative conflicts did not lessen. On the contrary, the absence of clear rules 
steering the relationship between federative units aggravated the conflicts Furthermore, the State 
budgetary deficits were transferred to the Federal Goverment, breaking a valued principle to federative 
systems, the independence between federative units. So, the Constitution of 1988 created a system that 
increased the autonomy of States and municipalities, though it was not able to guarantee 
responsibilities to these sub-units. The FRL tries to correct part of this problem. 
  10 Understanding the role of the FRL in public and regional development financing as well as in 
the allocation of public expenses is important to avoid hasty evaluations, both positive or negative 
ones. More than this, to make possible the knowledge of better ways to use public resources to 
adequate the limits imposed by the law. Among the important innovations brought by the FRL we 
point out: 
 
a)  Limitations in the expenses with the salaries, establishing not only the amount to be spent by each 
level of government according to the net receipt, but also - and that’s a novelty - the percentage 
due to the executive, legislative and judicial power, removing the previous distortions mainly in 
State governments;  
b)  Reaffirmation of more rigid limits which were already established by the Federal Senate for public 
debt, indicating that officials not behaving responsibly would be punished equally with more 
rigidity;  
c) Definition of fiscal annual targets and a requirement to present quarterly reports of fiscal 
administration, creating also other transparency mechanisms as the Council of Fiscal Management 
– to be constituted; 
d)  Establishment of control mechanisms for public finances in electoral years; 
e)  Prevention of financial help amongst the Federal Government and sub-national governments, 
creating a clearer relationship between the federative units and recovering the idea of fiscal 
federalism in its plenitude. 
 
The five items quoted above are of basic importance to increase the social control on public 
expenses, which impose accountability, as well as strengthening the federalism. One of the points that 
deserves distinction is the public debt. It is well known that debt is a recognized fiscal instrument of 
increasing expenses, which can be used as an anti-cyclical mechanism. The Federal Government as 
well as some states and municipalities can use this instrument to increase public expenditure in order 
to avoid stagnation and recession. However, the FRL, by establishing excessively rigid and non-
negotiable mechanisms, can lead to a fall in public investments. As a matter of fact, the monetary 
policy of the Central bank, in order to be compatible with the rigid targets of inflation, increases the 
debt by issuing bonds of the Federal Government and some states, which – given the limits of debt – is 
translated into a reduction of expenses particularly investments. In this way, there is an incompatibility 
between monetary and fiscal policies objectives. In order to maintain the debt inside the limits of the 
FRL there is a reduction of non-financing public spending to levels which are incompatible with the 
maintenance of the administrative engine. To sum up, from a macroeconomic point of view, the FRL 
combined with tight monetary policy, imposes significant restrictions on federative units, making it 
difficult for investments and for regional development policy that are based on public expenses. It’s 
worth to note that the Constitutional Funds of Financing are already set up as an important instrument 
of reduction of these imbalances, and, in theory, they are not directly affected by the FRL. However, 
to the extent that the tight monetary policies is associated with a restrictive fiscal policy in federal 
level it will affect the short term economic growth and consequently the revenue of taxes and the 
sources of financing for regional development. 
  11 However, the FRL modernizes and democratizes the instruments of fiscal management of 
public finances. According to Khair (2000), the FRL rely on four axes: projection, transparency, 
control and accountability. In other words, it affects not only the fiscal results but also the way the 
public finances are administrated. In order to understand the impacts of the FRL in all dimensions it is 
necessary to consider other indicators, even those not immediately quantifiable. Hence, it is possible to 
connect the FRL with several axes of more democratization and control of the public finances. 
At present we intend to emphasize the efficiency and the effectiveness of the law with respect 
to the four axes pointed above and to incorporate another one, which is related to the prohibition of 
help between governments, an essential innovation in Brazilian federative relationship. The five axes 
are the following: (1) the planning to manage revenues, expenditures and debts; (2) the publicity of the 
fiscal management reports; (3) the control of expenditures and debt; (4) the accountability, in other 
words, the submission of the accounts from the administrators of public resources to the governed 
ones and /or their representatives and (5) the elimination of the predatory characteristics of the 
financial relationship through the new rule that prohibits help between governments. To sum up, we 
intend here to point out the necessity of valuing the FRL in a multidimensional perspective. 
One of the most important aspects of this Law is the article 19 which imposes limits for total 
personnel expenditures. If the expenses of federative units exceed the prudential limit (95 % of the 
legal limit), several actions will be prohibited. For example: the concession of advantages, raising 
salaries, any salary adjustment or revision; the creation of offices, jobs or functions, new admissions of 
public servants as well as any type of admission or employment of personnel. If the reduction does not 
reach the maximum limit after the legal term, the officials will not receive the voluntary transfers and 
contracting credit operations as well as obtaining others guarantees will be suspended. 
However, the FRL promotes an inflexibility in the way federative units can spend their 
ressources. Despite its importance in controlling expenditures – and we know that Brazil has a long 
time practice of bad public administration of States and municipalities - the FRL restrain the use of an 
anti-cyclical fiscal policy. The basis of these policies are such that in periods of economic slowing 
down, it is convenient to the State to increase expenses to support the level of the aggregated demand. 
In effect, keynesian policies use the anti-cyclical effect of public spending to moderate the harfmful 
effects on income and GNP when the economy is slowing down. Increasing public spending (running 
into debt via emission of bonds) can produce a positive effect on the aggregated demand and the rise 
in the income allows, in a second moment, an increase of tax revenue. In periods of growing income, 
public spending can (and it has to) lessen. The FRL, such as approved, does not take into account the 
importance of the anti-cyclical effect of expenditure. In this sense, it ends up as an additional 
mechanism that eventually can aggravate the fiscal and financial situation of the federation. This 
happens because of the imposition of maintaining at any cost the inter-temporal budgetary balance in 
order to ensure primary surpluses that are compatible with the reduction of Debt/GDP rapport. 
From the point of view of regional imbalances, the FRL contributes to a destabilization of 
regional development policies. In a perspective of growing commercial and financial opening, market 
integration as well as increasing productivity, the productive activities tend to concentrate. This 
happens mainly because the capital tends to flow to consolidated and more lucrative sectors. The 
consequence is an increase in regional concentration of productive activities. In effect, without public 
  12 policies favoring regional development and mitigation of income and wealth concentration both 
regional imbalances and concentration of income and wealth, will worse. The FRL, despite its 
principles of increasing the democratization of information and budget may turn out to be another 
inhibiting instrument for policies aiming at moderate regional income and wealth inequalities.  
 
 
4. FINANCING SOURCES FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL 
 
The sources for regional financing in Brazil are characterized for a myriad of instruments and 
institutions that not always attain efficiency and perfect application of available resources. To the 
constitutional financing funds we add the fiscal funds for regional development (formerly linked to the 
SUDAM, SUDENE and at present to ADD and ADENE) as well as some support agencies as 
BNDES, CODEVASF (Company for the Development of Saint Francisco Valley), DNOCS 
(Department of Works against the drought) and SUFRAMA (Manaus free-trade bureau), among 
others. Thus, the absence of a regional de-concentration process in Brazil, particularly after the 1988’s 
Constitution, can not be attributed to a lack of financial instruments. Quite the opposite, as data on 
financing funds can demonstrate, the variety of subsidizing instruments is possibly one of the reasons 
for the inefficiency of the process. Besides, one cannot disconnect financing growing from economic 
development. 
In the last years, public financing in Brazil was limited by contracting fiscal and monetary 
policies. The high interest rates stimulate support banks to apply on public titles in order to guarantee a 
better resource administration. As a consequence, the credit operations were affected, and so were the 
projects that could possibly be financed. This becomes clear when we analyze the relationship 
between annual transfers from the National Treasure to the funds and the amount loaned by the funds. 
Table 4.1 shows the transfers from the National Treasure to Fiscal Financing Funds since 
1994. It is possible to observe that the transfers to the FINAM did not undergo abrupt falls as did the 
transfers to the FINOR after 2001. The transfers to the FINOR and FUNRES showed an evolution 
close to the behavior of the economy, collapsing after 1999. The same did not happen with the 
FINAM. According to Crocco (2003), despite the smaller share of the Northern region on the GNP 
comparing to the Northeast region, this growth rate was higher in the 1994-2003 period. As a result, a 
vicious circle of stagnation and fall in the credit and financing to these regions was established.
 4 
                                                       
4 Besides these funds, there are indirect mechanisms of regional development financing spread by several institutions. As 
examples we mention the Codevasf, the Suframa, the DNOCS and the BNDES (Crocco, 2003, p.319). 
  13 TABLE 4.1 
Transfers from the National Treasure to the Investment Fiscal Funds 
 
In thousands of R$ from the year 2000 
Year 
FINAM FINOR  FUNRES 
1994 -  177.270  - 
1995 331.836  336.079  11.897 
1996 156.646  402.064  14.988 
1997 257.263  468.044  22.802 
1998 346.119  410.543  13.334 
1999 401.930  329.595  18.576 
2000 549.656  428.748  16.663 
2001 (*)  119.530  (*) 
2002* 440.000  174.322 (*) 
2003* 465.000  (*) (*) 
 
                        Source: STN/SUDAM/BASA/SUDENE/BNB/GERES/BANDES 
                        * Refers to transfers to FDA 
                        (*) Data unavailable 
                         Obs: The Fiscal Funds FINAM and FINOR were closed to new projects in 05/02/2001  
                                  Together with the extinction of Sudene and Sudam. 
                                  The ADA (Agency for the development of Amazon) and ADENE (Agency for the Development of the 
North-east were created. 
                                   The FDA and the FDN, replacing the FINAM and the FINOR respectively were also created. 











































The transfers from the National Treasure to Constitutional Financing Funds (FNO, FCO and 
FNE) - the most important financing instruments for regional development as they are linked to the IPI 
and IR revenues – can be examined in Figure 4.1. In 15 years of the funds existence, the total transfers 
exceeded the significant amount of R$ 31 billions, at March 2002 prices. Notwithstanding the relative 
  14 stagnation from 1994 to 2000, after 2001 we observe a systematic elevation in the transfers. This 
suggests that the economic growth of the 1994-98 period was not followed by an increase in the tax 
revenues composing these funds. Actually, as already pointed out, the Gross Tax Burden remained 
nearly stable in the 1994-98 period (around 29,5 % of the GNP), presenting a systematic growth since 
then. The transfers to the Constitutional Funds can prove this fact. Despite the GNP inflections in 
1999, 2002 and 2003, the transfers increased, mainly due to the tax policies implemented by federal 
government
5.  
While the transfers from the Treasure remained stable until (up to) 2000 rising significantly 
afterwards, the contracted values and the operations administered by the funds increased after 1994. 
However, there was a reduction in the number of operations, reflecting a higher concentration in 
financing projects as shown in table 4.2. In fact, this behaviour fits well in the strategy of public 
Development Banks. By increasing efficiency and reducing the levering they also reduce their 




Number of Operations (OP) and Contracted Values (CV) 
Annual base - 1989/2002 
 
CV in thousands of R$ 
FCO FNO  FNE  Total 
Fund Year 
OP CV OP CV OP  CV OP  %  CV  % 
1989/1993 26.035 1.180.290  16.928  703.104  144.316  4.368.655 187.279  16,5  6.252.049  27,4 
1994  12.825 295.688 20.674 471.228 64.652  847.784 98.151 8,6 1.614.700 7,1 
1995  11.906 179.248 13.533 331.627 67.882  928.720 93.321 8,2 1.439.595 6,3 
1996  15.179 226.629 14.486 190.172 80.616 1.163.848  110.281 9,7 1.580.649 6,9 
1997  24.867 310.653  6.735  70.712  52.445  808.082 84.047  7,4 1.189.457 5,2 
1998 30.400  384.375  15.629  185.043  137.720 843.881  183.749  16,2  1.413.299  6,2 
1999  19.015 175.120 23.156 372.377 86.252  669.024  128.423  11,3  1.216.521 5,3 
2000  12.963 296.591 31.298 722.232 47.621  589.626 91.882 8,1 1.608.449 7,0 
2001  21.901 992.499 10.006 462.165 16.583  308.707 48.490 4,3 1.763.371 7,7 
2002 20.986  1.494.462  14.125  628.692  25.093 264.365  60.204  5,3  2.387.519  10,5 
2004  13.301 434.000  9.090  505.267 28.176  1.420.528 50.567  4,4 2.359.795  10,3 
Total  209.378 5.969.555 175.660 4.642.619 751.356  12.213.220  1.136.394 100 22.825.404 100 
 
Source: Bank of Brazil, Bank of Amazon and Bank of North-east reports. 
Values updated by BTN and TR, in march 2002 prices. 
 
 
Table 4.3 demonstrates that the strategy of the Constitutional Financing Funds administrators 
(Bank of Brazil, BNB and BASA) was one of reducing the volume of operations vis-à-vis the amounts 
loaned. In the last ten years, the FNE loans were on average well below the values transferred annually 
by the National Treasure. This behaviour is the corollary of the defensive strategy of public banks 
regarding the risks of credit. In fact, when lending to private borrowers, the public bank prefers to 
operate with public titles, that are more profitable and less risky. Since the LRF prevents loans to 
                                                       
5 Its worth to note that in the 1994-98 period, the GTB remained stable, so a simply growing in  the GNP could produce an 
elevation in the tax revenue and as a consequence, in the transfers to the funds. The explanations  for the stagnation of the 
federal transfers to the funds in this period are the probable low dynamics of the sectors responsible for collecting the tax 
revenues and the stagnation in the taxable income. 
  15 public institutions and the private sector has a low dynamism, even when linked to support programs, 
has been insufficient to stimulate local development and this way de-concentration.
6.  
Therefore, there is an asymmetry between the macroeconomic and regional development 
policies, and the search for better efficiency and less risk by bank institutions. As a consequence, there 
is a reduction in both credit supply and demand. The low dynamism of local private sector, combined 
with a credit system not much articulated, generate problems in the effective demand, compelling both 
public and banks to favor liquidity. Then a vicious circle of small volume of local credit (concentrated 
in more developed regions), low demand for resources and low economic dynamism is installed. Thus, 
the Funds do not fulfil their central objective of supporting development projects to reduce regional 
inequalities. Hence, financing and credit are crucial for success of regional development policy. More 






Fund Year  FCO  FNO  FNE 
1994  84,97 135,42 81,21 
1995 50,14 92,77 86,60 
1996 67,47 56,62  115,49 
1997 89,61 20,40 77,70 
1998 109,06 52,50 79,81 
1999  48,22 102,54 61,41 
2000  73,22 178,31 48,52 
2001 202,79 94,43 21,03 
2002 253,16  106,50 14,93 
2003* -  -  - 
2004 69,03 80,35 75,31 
 
                    *Data unavailable 
                    Source: Bank of Brazil, Bank of Amazon and Bank of North-east reports. 
 
 
The financing funds have a central role in regional development policy. However, the results 
depend on the recuperation of State planning capacity as well as on the co-ordination between federal 
government, public and private banks, states and local authorities. As already mentioned in section 2, 
the asymmetric and conflicting character of the federalism in Brazil, along with the limitations 
imposed by the FRL points out to the need of more clarity and efficiency in planning articulation. The 
role of credit in financing regional development is fundamental, as well as it is the articulation of 
private banks. Thus, it is important to analyze the role of credit and financial concentration as the 
corollary of regional imbalances in Brazil. A study focusing on financing regional development must 
concentrate not only on the federative discussion and financing funds but also on the nature of 
financial inequalities in Brazil. This aspect is discussed in the next topic. 
 
                                                       
6 To know more about the programs financed by the Constitutional Funds check the site of the Ministry of Integration: 
(www.integração.gov.br) 
  16 5. CREDIT AND BANK REGIONAL SYSTEM 
 
5.1. Bank system, Credit and the Center-Periphery relationship 
 
One of the most common neglects in studies about regional imbalances is the role of money 
and credit. The theoretical discussion on the subject - including that strictly connected with the 
Keynesian tradition, for which the regional inequalities presuppose cumulative processes (Kaldor, 
1966, Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975) - tends to disregard the role of money and credit in regional 
development. In this context, regional effects of the bank concentration process in Brazil after 1994 
has not been deserving the proper attention in the literature; Amado (1998) is one of the few 
exceptions. 
  As initially formulated by Dow (1982, 1987), the process of cumulative causation, much 
discussed theoretically and empirically by Kaldor and Myrdal, finds in the financial system an 
important instrument of intensification of regional imbalances. The region is a locus where the 
expectations are shaped and, as the levels of private investment are sensitive to these expectations, in 
some regions, identified as more risky, the economic agents tend to favor liquidity. Therefore, these 
regions may experience inadequate levels of effective demand. As the credit supply and demand are 
directly related not only to monetary policy, but also to borrowers and banks defensive attitudes, least 
developed regions tend to present, through the effects on monetary and income multiplier, less 
financial dynamism. As a result, there is a concentration of credit in more developed regions, since 
they are characterized by less uncertainty and less liquidity preference. Since this aspect is important 
to economic development, it is not possible to neglect the dynamic of the financial sector at regional 
level. In fact, before being merely a reflect of the “ real economy ” at regional level, this sector 
influences significantly the path of regional inequalities. 
  The peripheral economies are characterized by a stagnated economy, with underdeveloped 
markets predominating the primary sector and low technological content manufactures as well as an 
immature financial system
7. Its dynamism is dictated by the volume of exports to the centre. All these 
characteristics generate uncertainty about the economic performance of the region leading to a higher 
liquidity preference. The uncertainty about the future leads economic agents to seek for more liquid 
assets as a way of protection. Moreover, the investment decisions are delayed until more favorable 
economic setting (Dow, 1993 and Dow & Rodríguez-Fuentes, 2003). Concerning credit supply, it is 
plausible to suppose that the banking system is underdeveloped in peripheral regions and consequently 
less able to supply credit. Besides, the residents low levels of income in these regions restricts access 
to the banks, decreasing the amount of deposits (as a proportion of the income) and increasing the 
retention of paper-money by the public .  
  Distinctively, a central region is characterized by a prosperous economy and a sophisticated 
financial system. It is also a region with a productive system historically dominated by the industrial 
and services sector. Furthermore, it locates the financial institutions, making credit supply easier 
comparing to peripheral regions. All this picture increases security and confidence to invest in less 
liquid (and more profitable) assets leading to less liquidity preference in more prosperous regions. In 
effect, it is possible to infer that in central regions there will be more predisposition to demand as well 
                                                       
7 Even considering a national financing system without regional banks, its possible to believe that financial innovations 
implemented in central regions wil only be available to peripheral regions after a time lag.  
 
  17 as to supply credit. As a result, the process of cumulative causation takes place in a way that a 
decrease in the center’s liquidity preference will reduce even more the supply of credit in the 
periphery. This happens because the credit supply will move to places where there is a higher demand 
(Crocco, 2005). 
In order to understand the dynamics of the regional financing system and its relationship with 
the economic dynamics its important to figure out what is called by Ron Martin (1999, p.9) as “a 
geographic circuit of the money”. This circuit can be characterized by two aspects. The first one is the 
location structure of the financial system which is directly connected with the urban structure and its 
centrality in a particular region. The urban hierarchy determines a financial hierarchy, in other words, 
an agglomeration of banking institutions in a more developed place would also offer more 
sophisticated services. 
Another aspect is the so-called institutional geography of the financial system, which refers to 
the dissimilarities in the institutional models between countries. These differences affect banking 
development. There are several implications resulting from the difference between a model of regional 
banks (small banks, with headquarter acting only in the region), as in United States and Italy, and a 
model composed by large national banks, as in England and Brazil. 
Alessandrini (1999) and Martin (1999), among others, affirm that local banks tend to be more 
involved with the local economy being more affected by its economic oscillations. On the other side, 
national banks manage to protect themselves from local economic instability, compensating losses in 
these regions with profits in other localities. Banks of this type, with headquarter in the centre and 
acting also in the periphery, are more reticent concerning the extension of credit to periphery. The 
raisons are the higher volatility in the dissemination of information. In this way, different institutional 
geographies can produce different processes of money circulation (savings, credit and applications).  
It is also worthy emphasize that, in general, peripheral economies have an informal sector 
more important comparing to central regions. As a result, the banks ratio cash-deposits is higher, 
generating a smaller monetary multiplier and consequently difficulties in access to credit. This vicious 
circle makes investment still more difficult in peripheral regions. 
  Brazil, as pointed out by Crocco (2004a), has strong regional financial disparities, which is a 
reflex of its economic inequality (latu sensu). Bank agencies are concentrated in most developed 
regions, so that these regions have a higher participation in the amount of deposits and credits. Taking 
as a starting point the relationship centre-periphery and its credit and monetary characteristics we 
intend to analyze the regional dimension of financing in Brazil, demonstrating also the relevant role of 
credit concentration and enhanced liquidity on regional imbalances in Brazil. 
 
 
5.2. Regional and Financial Inequalities in Brazil 
 
To assess the regional influence of the financial variables, we extracted data from the Sisbacen 
(Central Bank System of Information) database. The database contain information on monthly 
statistics from 1988 to 2004 for all Federation Units. The data refer to main accounting items (assets 
and liabilities) of the financial system, with the aggregated monthly value for each operation for all 
local financial institutions. Through this database it is possible to evaluate the banking regional 
concentration and its effects on regional inequalities in Brazil. 
  18 By now we have already examined the Financing Funds for regional development; hereafter 
we focus on the role of financial system, particularly private banks. To date there isn’t a well 
consolidated system to finance development in Brazil. An historical retrospect shows that the financial 
private sector, as states Alves Jr. (2002, p.332), “was very competent to survive instability, but it did 
not appear able to produce the amount of credit and investment funding necessary to promote 
sustainable economic growth”. It is from this perspective that we intend to seek for ways to block this 
adverse trajectory. The State intervention, mainly in credit supply can open “windows of opportunity” 
to increase private credit in less developed regions and, in this way, lessen the harmful effects of 
financial concentration on the perspectives of reducing the regional disparities. 
From the sum of two accounts from the balance available in the Sisbacen database, the Loans 
and Deducted Bonds account and the Financing account, we calculated an index of credit 
concentration by region and state, taking as a basis the sum for the whole country. Table 5.1 shows the 




Index of Credit Concentration by Federative Unit - Brazil 
 
Region  1991  Region  1997  Region  2003 
Roraima  0,01   Amapá  0,02   Roraima  0,05  
Amapá  0,03   Roraima  0,04   Acre  0,08  
Tocantins  0,04   Acre  0,06   Amapá  0,08  
Piaui  0,16   Tocantins  0,10   Tocantins  0,18  
Acre  0,20   Rondônia  0,17   Rondônia  0,20  
Rondônia  0,21   Paraíba  0,27   Sergipe  0,27  
Paraíba  0,22   Sergipe  0,28   Piaui  0,28  
Sergipe  0,30   Amazonas  0,32   Alagoas  0,33  
Rio Grande do Norte  0,37   Rio Grande do Norte  0,38   Amazonas  0,33  
Amazonas  0,39   Piaui  0,38   Rio Grande do Norte  0,44  
Alagoas  0,46   Maranhão  0,40   Maranhão  0,45  
Maranhão  0,60   Pará  0,51   Paraíba  0,55  
Espírito Santo  0,69   Alagoas  0,57   Mato Grosso do Sul  0,66  
Mato Grosso do Sul  0,79   Espírito Santo  0,72   Pará  0,67  
Pará  0,91   Mato Grosso do Sul  0,80   Mato Grosso  0,68  
Mato Grosso  0,94   Mato Grosso  0,90   Espírito Santo  0,78  
Goiás  1,21   Goiás  1,05   Ceará  1,13  
North  1,80   Pernambuco  1,06   Pernambuco  1,44  
Ceará  1,94   Ceará  1,06   Goiás  1,45  
Pernambuco  2,34   North  1,27   North  1,59  
Santa Catarina  2,68   Distrito Federal  1,80   Santa Catarina  1,93  
Rio Grande do Sul  3,44   Santa Catarina  1,94   Bahia  1,94  
Paraná  4,32   Bahia  2,72   Distrito Federal  2,35  
Bahia  4,47   Paraná  3,59   Paraná  3,42  
Distrito Federal  6,94   Rio Grande do Sul  3,93   Rio Grande do Sul  4,96  
Minas Gerais  8,60   Minas Gerais  4,49   Center-West  5,13  
Center-West  9,95   Center-West  4,54   Minas Gerais  5,37  
Sou
th
10,44   Northeast  7,13   Northeast  6,85  
Northeast  10,95   Rio de Janeiro  7,87   Rio de Janeiro  8,67  
Rio de Janeiro  14,86   Sou
th
9,46   Sou
th
10,30  
São Paulo  42,72   São Paulo  64,52   São Paulo  61,10  
Southea
t
66,87   Southea
t
77,60   Southea
t
75,62  
Brazil  100,00   Brazil  100,00  Brazil  100,00  
Source: Sisbacen             
 
 
  19 It is clear, once more, the strong predominance of the South-east Region and the growth of its 
concentration, varying from 66,87 % to 75,62 % during the period. Its not a surprise that São Paulo 
State concentrates most of the credit (more than 60 % of the total credit in 2003). Its worth noting that 
in high inflation periods (and this can be reflecting indexation problems), the credit concentration was 
much smaller than in the period following monetary stabilization. The maps of credit concentration 
can demonstrate the process of increasing concentration in the nineties.  To bank concentration, 
observed after the Real Plan (Alves Jr, 2002), we can add a concentration in credit supply. A well 
articulated process of economic de-concentration and reduction of regional imbalances can only be 
possible concomitantly with a process of financial de-concentration. However, without the 




5.2.3. Financial Intermediation and Financial Imbalances 
 
Through the annual Regional Accounts, which are GNP indicators for each State and 
economic activity, it is possible to obtain data from 1998 to 2001 about the activities related to 
financial intermediation at regional level. The concept of financial intermediation was set by the IBGE 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). 
Table 5.2 shows the participation of the Regions, States and the Federal District (DF) in the 
economic activity as a whole and on financial intermediation. Table 5.3 presents the weight of 
financial intermediation in total economic activity for each state and the DF.  
We remark the expressive participation of the DF in financial intermediation activity. However, 
this is due to the fact that many operations of the Central Bank, Federal Savings Bank and Bank of 
Brazil, as well as the National Treasure are accounted for the DF. Consequently, the values for the DF 
participation are overestimated. 
Table 5.2 also demonstrates that geographic concentration in financial activities is more 
important than concentration in economic activity. Besides, the degree of concentration of financial 
activities increased along the period of analysis. This happens because financial services tend to 
concentrate in large economic centers. The economic concentration in South-east varied from 57.7% 
in 1998 to 57.2 % in 2001 while the financial concentration increased from 61.6 % to 69 % in the 
same period. In the Northern region, the less representative at national level, economic concentration 
varied from 4.5 % to 4.7 % and financial concentration from 1.5 % to 1.7 % in the period. The Manaus 
Free-Trade Area and the extractive activities in this region can explain these results. The small share 
of financial intermediation is explained, as for other less developed states, by the leaks of credit to 
more developed regions. In fact, although the production can take place in a particular region, as the 
financial system in Brazil is centralized and lacks regional banks (except the investment banks), part 
of the financing activities takes place in large centers like Sao Paulo. This fact corroborates the 
theoretical argument discussed above that the leaks in the financial sector tend to aggravate regional 
imbalances. 
  20 In Table 5.3 we observe that São Paulo is the State where the part of financial intermediation in 
the value added of productive activities and services is the largest one, 9.5 % in 2001 (against 8.2 % in 
1998). In the Northern region we find the sates where the relevance of financial intermediation in the 
economy are less important. At the end of the period, all states in this region, except for Tocantins (4.1 
% in 2001), had participation of the financial activity below 3 %. 
This behavior corroborates the argument that peripheral regions tend to prefer liquidity and 
consequently experience less supply and demand for credit. At the same time they also use less the 
bank sector in productive activities (less financial intermediation). The absence of a robust financial 
system to finance local economic activities support the vicious circle of stagnation and informality in 

























Brazil  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
North  4,5  1,5  4,5  1,6  4,6  1,9  4,7  1,7 
Rondônia  0,5  0,1  0,5  0,1  0,5  0,2  0,5  0,2 
Acre  0,2  0  0,2  0  0,2  0,1  0,2  0,1 
Amazonas  1,6  0,4  1,6  0,4  1,7  0,5  1,7  0,4 
Roraima  0,1  0  0,1  0  0,1  0  0,1  0 
Pará  1,7  0,8  1,8  0,9  1,8  0,9  1,8  0,8 
Amapá  0,2  0  0,2  0  0,2  0,1  0,2  0 
Tocantins  0,2  0,1  0,2  0,1  0,2  0,2  0,2  0,2 
North 
t
13,1  7,3  13,1  7  13  7,8  13  7,9 
Maranhão  0,8  0,3  0,8  0,3  0,8  0,5  0,9  0,5 
Piauí  0,5  0,1  0,5  0,1  0,5  0,3  0,5  0,3 
Ceará  2,1  1,4  2  1,4  1,9  1,3  1,8  1,5 
Rio Grande do Norte  0,7  0,4  0,8  0,5  0,8  0,4  0,8  0,4 
Paraíba  0,8  0,2  0,8  0,2  0,8  0,4  0,9  0,5 
Pernambuco  2,7  1,2  2,7  1,2  2,6  1,6  2,6  1,5 
Alagoas  0,7  0,3  0,7  0,3  0,6  0,4  0,6  0,4 
Sergipe  0,6  0,2  0,5  0,2  0,5  0,4  0,7  0,4 
Bahia  4,2  3,1  4,3  2,9  4,3  2,5  4,3  2,3 
Southea
t
57,7  61,6  57,8  64,1  57,5  66,1  57,2  69 
Minas Gerais  9,8  5,4  9,6  6  9,7  6  9,4  6 
Espírito Santo  1,7  0,5  1,8  0,5  1,8  1,2  1,7  1 
Rio de Janeiro  11  10  11,8  10,8  12,7  10,9  12,5  10 
São Paulo  35,3  45,7  34,7  46,8  33,3  48  33,6  52 
Sou
th
17,6  11,6  17,9  12,1  17,6  13,2  17,8  12,4 
Paraná  6,3  4,9  6,4  5  6  5,3  6,1  5,1 
Santa Catarina  3,5  1,1  3,6  1,1  3,8  2  3,9  2 
Rio Grande do Sul  7,8  5,6  7,8  6  7,8  5,9  7,9  5,4 
Center-West  7,1  17,9  6,8  15,2  7,2  11,1  7,3  9 
Mato Grosso do Sul  1,1  0,6  1,1  0,6  1,1  0,6  1,1  0,6 
Mato Grosso   1,1  0,5  1,2  0,5  1,2  0,8  1,2  0,8 
Goiás  1,9  1  1,8  0,9  1,9  1,4  2  1,3 
DCl  3  15,8  2,7  13,2  3  8,3  2,9  6,4 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statitics ( IBGE) – National Accounts, 2001 
1998  1999  2000  2001 
 
 
  21 TABLE 5.3 
Share of Financial Intermediaries in the Grow Added Value by States 
 
1998  1999  2000  2001 
Brazil  6,3  5,9  5,2  6,1 
Rondônia  1,4  1,3  1,6  2,1 
Acre  1,9  1,6  2  2,7 
Amazonas  1,6  1,5  1,4  1,4 
Roraima  1,1  1,2  2  2,5 
Pará  3,1  2,9  2,7  2,6 
Amapá  1,8  1,7  1,6  1,5 
Tocantins  2,7  2,5  4,6  4,1 
Maranhão  2,3  2  3,1  3,8 
Piauí  1,5  1,3  3,1  4,2 
Ceará  4,4  4,1  3,5  5,3 
Rio Grande do Norte  3,7  3,8  2,6  3,1 
Paraíba  1,8  1,7  2,7  3,8 
Pernambuco  2,9  2,6  3,1  3,4 
Alagoas  2,9  2,7  3,2  3,5 
Sergipe  2  1,8  3,8  3,4 
Bahia  4,7  4  3,1  3,3 
Minas Gerais  3,5  3,7  3,3  3,9 
Espírito Santo  1,8  1,6  3,4  3,5 
Rio de Janeiro  5,8  5,5  4,5  4,9 
São Paulo  8,2  8  7,5  9,5 
Paraná  4,9  4,6  4,6  5,2 
Santa Catarina  2  1,8  2,8  3,1 
Rio Grande do Sul  4,6  4,6  3,9  4,2 
Mato Grosso do Sul  3,4  3  2,9  3,1 
Mato Grosso   2,9  2,5  3,4  3,9 
Goiás  3,3  3,1  3,7  3,9 













































Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statitics ( IBGE) – National Accounts, 2001  
 
 
  Hence, the empirical evidence goes alongside the hypothesis that a bank system based on large 
national banks as in Brazil, stimulates bank concentration. Nevertheless, because their headquarters 
are localized in the economic centers (the South-east particularly São Paulo in Brazil), they feed and 
accentuate the industrial concentration process. 
Owing to more stability and less uncertainty, the logic of the market leads to concentration of 
credit in the central region. Therefore, firms in that region are privileged with better access to credit 
and diversified bank services. However, in Brazil, there is an aggravating factor: the industrialization 
of the peripheral regions was stimulated by government in such a way that activities in those places 
started on mainly as branches of enterprises whose headquarters where in the center. Thus, the credit 
operations happen mainly in the headquarters and the leaking of deposits is high. Again, there is a 
predominance of a vicious circle that, in the absence of intervention, tend to perpetuate itself. 
 
  22 6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although it may seem simple at first sight, the relationship between regional imbalances and 
financial system is not trivial. In fact, if credit concentration is the corollary of regional imbalances in 
Brazil, the dynamics of public and banks liquidity preference imposes more awareness in the 
formulation of regional development policies. The financing of regional development policy in Brazil 
cannot be understood without considering its connection to the fiscal mechanisms of public financing, 
to the Fiscal Responsibility Law and to the nature of the federalism. 
In fact, the debate on regional development policies in Brazil must include broader issues, like 
the articulation of the banking system (public and private), the characteristics of tax resources 
distribution, and the limitations of public expenses imposed by the FRL. The role of the State, despite 
its distortions, is crucial in this arrangement since financing policies for regional development depends 
on government. Although it is not our purpose here to discuss this point, we must not forget that in 
Brazil the participation of the State in policies for regional development led to huge distortions. It 
benefited the local elite and sustained the stagnation of the poor regions. These effects can be reduced 
through the institutionalization of financing policies based on targets and results, where the creation of 
new credit supply will depend on goals accomplished by the projects. 
  The results obtained in this research demonstrate the importance of rethinking the strategy of 
use of the Constitutional and Fiscal Financing Funds for regional development. These funds must be 
used in its entirety in order to avoid that the transfers from the National Treasury are kept in the public 
banks being used for operations of better efficiency, but inefficient as public instruments for 
increasing credit supply. 
  In the same way, the existence of a competitive federative system
8 as well as the requirements 
of the FRL goes against the most efficient policies of regional development. It would be naïve to make 
the FRL responsible for the difficulties of increasing public expenses and rendering regional 
development policies not viable. The regional imbalances in Brazil are well known and certainly they 
did not worsen in the last years because of limitations imposed by the FRL. However, it is clear that 
fiscal policies preventing public investment, specially when combined with restraining monetary 
policies, produce harmful effects to economic growth in the short term and consequently, on the long 
term development
9. This, plus the consolidation of an “obsession for the fiscal balance” policy 
generates an amplification of the regional imbalances. The main raison for this is the fact that 
investments and augmentation of credits in less developed regions are risky and have less return rate. 
                                                       
8 Competitive federalism stands for several federative sub-spheres trying to benefit of the possibilities to increase their own 
receipts while the federal government tries to create mechanisms to reduce tax transfers. Typical cases of federative 
competition are the fiscal war and the increase in the Tax Burden by the federal government through the creation of 
contributions not submitted to sharing as COFINS and CSLL. 
9 About the mistaken mix of economic policies in Brazil in the last years, its worth to emphasize that a restraining monetary 
policy base don high interest rates magnifies fiscal imbalances through increasing public debt cost. Confronted to the 
necessity of reducing the ratio debt/GDP to obtain more credibility in financial market its impossible to operate with a 
fiscal balanced fiscal policy. In the attempt to reduce the operational deficit (and to guarantee larger primary surpluses) the 
National Treasury reduces investment and funding expenses. Consequently, the “worst of the worlds” takes place: 
monetary policy with high interest rates to keep inflation targets and a fiscal policy whose most significant expenses are the 
payment of interests and the amortization of internal debt. Its easy to observe the difficulty in using this type of policy mix 
to stimulate regional development policies. 
  23   Finally, its worth to emphasize the effect of the credit system on regional disparities. 
Confirming the theoretical argument, the empirical results for Brazil, using the Sisbacen database, 
reveal the important role of the financial system as a component of those inequalities. In fact, the 
concentration of credit in more developed regions (mainly South-east region and São Paulo State), the 
liquidity preference both of banks and public in the Northern and Northeast regions – and its effects on 
credit supply and demand – and, finally, the relationship of these variables with the financial 
intermediation, demonstrate the importance of the financial system and credit for regional 
development. 
  From the connection between the three elements above summarized the policy proposals must 
recognize the importance of the financial system regulations, of the tax resources distribution and of 
the institutional arrangement for public expenses. In this way, this subject must be introduced in the 
regional optics instead of being treated only under the macroeconomic point of view. 
. 
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